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been able to reduce our expenditures with the 
publishers when needed.  The important point 
is that we can do so much more easily now.
Negotiations have not been adversely af-
fected by our departures.  Publishers still, and 
always will, want as much of our (and your) 
budget as they can get, and will negotiate to 
achieve that.  This is why, contrary to what may 
seem obvious, we have for the most part been 
able to negotiate lower increases than what we 
had when we were in the Big Deals.
The advantages to not participating in 
Big Deals are clear.  How to explain their 
resiliency?  Most institutions are not so flush 
with funding that the costs of Big Deals, as 
described above, are avoided.  
The value must be assumed to be worth 
those costs.
The appeal of Big Deals appears obvious: 
access to journals not otherwise available.  The 
value also appears obvious, as most frequently 
shown by download numbers.  We too were 
susceptible to the appeal, and impressed by 
the apparent value, of our Deals.  When we 
looked more closely, which we were forced 
to do because the faulty premise of the model 
became more and more exposed, the lush land-
scape of plenty looked more like a mirage, and 
the numbers were printed on a house of cards.
Assessment of resources relies heavily on 
the number of downloads and a Cost Per Use 
calculation.  (These may or may not be the 
only assessment components, but is anyone not 
using them?)  These metrics, particularly the 
latter, can then be compared to those of other 
resources.  The higher the download numbers, 
and the lower the Cost Per Use figure, the stron-
ger the case for the Big Deal, or any resource.
Little attention is given to any interpretation 
of the numbers.  Downloads are taken at face 
value as an objective criterion of assessment. 
A download is a “good thing,” an accurate 
indicator of demand.  Further, downloads are 
downloads, and it is assumed that there is 
no difference between a download from one 
publisher, vendor, or resource compared to 
another.  Partly this is due to the success of the 
Counter standards that have been developed, 
which do achieve at least some consistency in 
the reporting of resource use.  Partly it is due 
to the difficulty of tracing how downloaded 
content is actually used.
There is a real need for the profession 
to examine these assumptions more closely. 
Much is riding on them, but serious exam-
ination of them has only occurred around the 
edges.  Our experience suggests that there are 
significant flaws in these assumptions, and 
that while download numbers are essential in 
assessment, they do not contain any meaning in 
and of themselves.  A detailed description of the 
evidence provided by our experience at SIUC 
is outside the scope here, but is summarized 
below (more information can be found in Nabe, 
Jonathan and Fowler, David.  “Leaving the 
‘Big Deal’ … Five Years Later.”  The Serials 
Librarian 69, No. 1 (Jul 2015): 20-28. doi:10.
1080/0361526X.2015.1048037).  For the sake 
of brevity, the case of only one publisher is 
discussed here, but the observations and trends 
are applicable for the others as well.  
Downloads of non-subscribed content alone 
from this publisher amounted to 11,254 from 
597 titles in the year before we ceased our 
Big Deal.  These are phenomenal numbers 
that would seem to go a long way to justifying 
the Deal.  Closer examination revealed some 
concerns, however.  To begin with, 62% of 
the non-subscribed titles had averaged less 
than 12 downloads per year, and a full 10% 
had received no downloads.  By any measure, 
these were not essential titles for the University.
Even more clarification was provided by 
analysis conducted post-departure.  We did 
this analysis because we wanted to measure 
the impact of our decisions; it was possible, 
after all, that they had been the wrong ones. 
The results indicated otherwise.
Downloads and the CPU calculations 
derived from them can only work for paid 
content.  How do you assess the value of lost 
content, or measure the impact of a decision 
to end access to it?  Requests via Interlibrary 
loan for lost titles can serve as a proxy for 
actual demand, and that is the method we have 
used.  Objections can be made that ILLs do 
not fully represent all demand, either, since 
researchers can use professional and personal 
networks, individual subscriptions, open access 
repositories or websites, etc., to get the content. 
Download numbers over-report demand, ILL 
requests under-report it.  The real demand lies 
somewhere in between, no one really knows 
where.  But in addition to serving as a correc-
tive to the download numbers in the attempt to 
measure demand and calculate value, analysis 
of ILL requests in this context also fulfills a 
practical need: it tells us the impact on library 
operations, staff time and outlays, of leaving 
Big Deals.  
Again, for brevity’s sake details are provid-
ed for the single publisher used above.  Briefly, 
the annual number of ILL requests averages 
2% of the pre-departure downloads of the 
non-subscribed titles, over the five year period 
post-departure.  47% percent of the lost titles 
which had some downloads pre-departure have 
not had any ILL requests.  The average number 
of ILL requests per title is less than two.  There 
has been no flood of requests for ILLs, putting 
pressure on the staff, or spike in our costs, 
putting pressure on our budget.  While the 
ratio of requests to downloads has increased 
over the years — to be expected as additional 
issues of the journals are published — it has 
never reached a level that cannot be absorbed 
by the library as part of its everyday workflow. 
If any given title is shown by ILL requests to 
warrant an individual subscription, swapping 
for a lesser used title is always possible — but 
has not been indicated to date.
What this analysis shows is that for us, Big 
Deals were unaffordable overkill.  Nice to have, 
for public relation’s sake and for convenience’s 
sake too.  But they were not providing essential 
content;  on the contrary, they were forcing 
us to cut essential resources, and would have 
done so at an accelerating rate had we main-
tained them.  Leaving them has not led us to 
the brink of oblivion, it has just taken us back 
to the place we all came from:  a Library with 
the subscriptions that the University needs and 
that we can afford.  
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The University of Wisconsin-Madison has a long history with the Big Deal. In 2001 Ken Frazier, who at the time 
was the University Librarian at UW-Madison, 
wrote an article in D-Lib Magazine in which 
he coined for the first time the phrase the “Big 
Deal” as a way to describe journal publishers’ 
large-scale journal aggregations.1  In his article, 
Frazier warned libraries against trading short-
term benefits for long-term consequences. 
The Big Deal, he warned, weakened library 
collections with unwanted journals, increased 
libraries’ dependence on publishers, reduced 
budgetary flexibility, limited libraries’ ability 
to influence the scholarly communications 
system in the future, threatened serials vendors, 
and placed limits on resource sharing.  Frazier 
said UW-Madison would take a principled 
stance and hold out against the Big Deal.  It 
would license electronic access to only the 
highest-used journal titles.  It would keep 
the rest of its journals in print, select journals 
title-by-title, and continue to rely on resource 
sharing for access to other content.
Four years later Frazier published anoth-
er article on the Big Deal.2  In it he outlined 
how UW-Madison was continuing to hold 
out against the Big Deal, but was also faced 
with both a difficult local budget situation 
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and escalating journal costs.  These had led 
to the systematic cancelation of journals with 
“no end to the cutting in sight.”3  Life without 
the Big Deal, according to Frazier, meant 
not having the resources users needed and 
“always having to say you are sorry to faculty 
and researchers.”4  Within a few years of that 
article the university had signed agreements 
for two Big Deals.
A decade later the financial situation 
Frazier had described at UW-Madison had 
not improved.  Over that time the Libraries’ 
collections budget had continued to stagnate, 
losing nearly $4 million in buying power. 
Journal cancelations continued to be the 
norm, while the amount of money spent on 
interlibrary loan (ILL) had expanded dramat-
ically.  Frazier was no longer the University 
Librarian, but the Libraries still only had those 
two Big Deals.  This was partly a result of 
UW-Madison’s principled stance against the 
Big Deal.  In many ways, however, the impact 
of Frazier’s philosophy was secondary to 
structural barriers that existed at the university 
and the Libraries.
A decentralized administrative structure 
for libraries at UW-Madison hindered any 
move toward the acquisition of large journal 
packages.  The university’s General Library 
System (GLS) consists of 16 of the larger 
campus libraries, but there were nearly 25 
additional libraries on campus.  While campus 
libraries cooperated on a variety of fronts, the 
large number of independent actors made it 
difficult to reach a consensus.  Further ex-
acerbating the problem was a historic desire 
for each library to pay “their fair share.”  If a 
library was unable or unwilling to do so, this 
had the ability to derail any collaborative col-
lections efforts.  Finally, a budgetary model in 
the GLS that allocated collections funds at the 
lowest possible fund-level hampered efforts to 
make large central acquisitions like Big Deals.
I arrived at UW-Madison in 2014 and be-
gan to review the Libraries’ entire collections 
program, including the journal packages the 
university did and did not have.  Through this 
initial analysis it became very clear to me that 
the library needed to take a closer look at jour-
nal packages from several publishers.  That 
subsequent analysis focused almost solely 
on saving money, including an examination 
of both inflation and ILL costs.  The library 
analyzed how much inflation it was seeing an-
nually on existing subscriptions from specific 
publishers and then used that data to create 
projections for potential savings over time. 
ILL borrowing and lending over time was 
also analyzed to determine potential savings 
and to project potential revenue.  The goal 
of this analysis was to identify at what point 
these potential Big Deals would begin saving 
UW-Madison money and how much those 
savings would be over time.  In the end, we 
identified two Big Deals that had the potential 
to provide significant and immediate savings. 
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From the start I was very open and up front 
as I discussed the benefits and downsides 
of the Big Deals with selectors and campus 
libraries staff.  While publishers almost invari-
ably talked about the “value” of the new con-
tent the library would be adding, I deliberately 
downplayed that fact.  It was felt that those 
discussions could be a distraction from the 
true focus, which was saving money.  It was 
true that this added content was key to achiev-
ing savings on ILL, but I was also cognizant of 
philosophical concerns and arguments, such 
as the one Frazier made, regarding how Big 
Deals mix weak and strong titles together. 
Overall, however, the obstacles that needed 
to be overcome had to do almost ex-
clusively with structural barriers rather 
than philosophical concerns. 
In working with non-GLS campus 
libraries, the goal was to remove im-
pediments to participation.  The GLS 
needed to abandon the “fairness” 
approach and reassure these 
libraries that it would 
not cost them more 
to participate.  To do 
that the GLS agreed to 
pick up the additional 
costs associated with 
these Big Deals.  In 
these discussions, the 
inflation control as-
pect of these packages 
was promoted and the 
libraries were provid-
ed information on how much money these 
packages would be saving them over time.  
For conversations with selectors the focus 
was on the big picture.  They were shown how 
much money the libraries would be saving and 
how this benefited them in the end.  To fund 
these Big Deals the Libraries were going to 
move money allocated for journal subscrip-
tions that were part of these packages from 
selectors’ individual fund lines to a centralized 
fund line.  This would remove the ongoing 
inflation burden from those funds for titles 
that they could no longer cancel.  While there 
was some push back from some selectors, as 
they were concerned that their funds were now 
smaller, I explained that the appearance of the 
bigger budget was a façade, as they would 
have no control over many of those titles.  
After laying the groundwork for several 
months, the addition of the two new Big Deals 
ended up being a non-issue.  Being up front 
about the positive and negative aspects of 
these Big Deals demonstrated an awareness 
of the philosophical concerns surrounding 
them.  Likewise, by providing comprehensive 
data, abandoning the “fairness” principle and 
centralizing the funding of Big Deals the 
Libraries were able to overcome structural 
barriers it faced.  Finally, by articulating a 
succinct goal and using a thorough analysis to 
illustrate how that goal could be achieved, the 
Libraries were able to develop strong buy-in. 
And in the end, both packages acquired actu-
ally ended up saving the Libraries even more 
money in the first year than initially projected.
Now that the Libraries have doubled the 
number of Big Deals at our university, does 
this mean UW-Madison is a fan of the Big 
Deal?  In a word, no.  Many of the concerns 
that Frazier outlined fifteen years ago still 
exist.  Big Deals do bundle “weak” journals 
with the “strong.”  But libraries have found 
that “weak” journals often see greater use 
than “strong” journals.  Big Deals do limit 
budgetary flexibility.  UW-Madison has seen 
a decrease in spending on monographs that is, 
in part, directly related to additional spend-
ing on journals.  At the same time, however, 
UW-Madison has transformed into a cam-
pus with a heavy STEM focus and perhaps 
the shift toward those 
kinds of resources is 
both inevitable and a 
sign that the Libraries 
are changing with the 
campus.  Finally, Big 
Deals do diminish the 
role of serial vendors. 
Certainly the instabili-
ty in this marketplace, 
as seen with the recent 
SWETS bankruptcy, 
can have negative im-
pacts on libraries, but 
one has to question 
whether this is a valid 
reason to avoid the Big 
Deal.  
Avoiding the Big 
Deal at UW-Madison 
did not solve the serials crisis, nor did it end 
up saving the university money.  Journal pub-
lishing continues to exist in an environment 
that is devoid of normal market controls, 
and avoiding the Big Deal simply moved 
costs from our collections budget to our 
ILL budget.  That doesn’t mean it was the 
wrong choice.  Over time philosophies and 
approaches change.  Interestingly, the biggest 
barrier the Libraries faced was not that shift 
in philosophy, but overcoming the structural 
barriers and intransigence that existed local-
ly.  The decision to add these Big Deals was 
based on practicality and saving money.  If a 
better option had existed the Libraries would 
have gone down that road.  UW-Madison, 
like many libraries, chose the Big Deal not 
because it was a wonderful model, but because 
sometimes it is pragmatism and not principles 
that wins the day.  
